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Labor Use in Agricultural Production
Labor is another key asset for smallholder households in rural Malawi. Labor 
available to the household (its numbers, education, skills, and health) consti-
tutes the human capital that becomes the basis of constructing household 
livelihood strategies. In the context of Malawi’s smallholder production 
where farm mechanization is virtually nonexistent and all farm work is done 
manually, having access to necessary labor for agricultural production di-
rectly affects the levels of household farm income. In addition to own farming, 
household labor may also be deployed in off-farm economic activities, thus 
providing additional income to the household.
This chapter first examines the types of labor used in agricultural produc-
tion and its allocation to different farm tasks and crops. It also highlights 
major characteristics of labor contracts that were used by households to obtain 
necessary labor. In addition, engagement in agricultural wage labor by house-
hold members is examined. In the vocabulary of the livelihood framework, 
the chapter analyzes labor in terms of assets (family labor), access (sources of 
labor and labor contracts), and economic activity (engagement in agricultural 
wage labor).1
3.1 Labor Use
Most of the farm work in rural Malawi is done during the rainy season be-
tween November and March. The types and sequences of farm tasks in the 
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production of the two major crops, maize and tobacco, are summarized in 
Figure 3.1. The figure clearly shows that tobacco production requires more 
farm work than maize production in terms of both the number of farm tasks 
and the length of the cultivation period.
The types of labor used in agricultural production can be broadly classified 
into two categories: family labor and hired labor. Of these, family labor was 
the main source of labor in the villages studied. As Table 3.1 shows, family 
labor accounted for 74 percent of total labor used in tobacco production and 
88 percent of that in maize production.
The importance of family labor in farm work and the lack of mechanization 
in agricultural production imply that the availability of family labor influ-
ences the household farm size. The correlation coefficients between household 
farm size and the number of household members whose age was 15 years old 
or over were positive in all six villages and statistically significant (at the 1 
percent level) in Kachamba, Belo, and Bongololo. This signifies the impor-
Fig. 3.1   Farming Calendar
A. Maize
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tance of the quantity of family labor in expanding the household farm size.
A qualification is necessary, however. The increase of farm size using 
abundant family labor is possible only under the condition that land is readily 
available for the expansion of a family’s farm. This is not always the case in 
most of rural Malawi today because increasing population pressure on the 
land has considerably reduced the scope of farm expansion onto uncultivated 
land. An exception was Belo, where at the time of the study unopened land 
was still readily available, and there remained the possibility for farm expan-
sion. In the cases of Kachamba and Bongololo, however, unopened land was 
hardly available. In the two villages, it was the existence of vernacular land 
markets that enabled some households to expand the size of their farm by 
obtaining additional land through purchase or rental, as discussed in the pre-
vious chapter. These characteristics unique to each village opened some scope 
for farm expansion for labor abundant households.
Apart from family labor available within the household, labor exchanges 
among relatives that involved other households were also practiced. In most 
TABLE 3.1   Labor Input into Maize and Tobacco Production by Type of Labor and Farm 
Task (man days / ha)
A. Maize
Total Land Prep. Sowing Fertilizer Application Weeding Banking Harvesting
Family labor 155 69 9 6 40 17 15
Hired labor 21 10 1 1 4 3 2
Total 176 79 9 7 45 20 17
B. Tobacco
Total Land Prep. Nursery Transplanting
Manure/
Fertilizer 
Application
Constructing Barn
Family labor 538 24 113 15 20 48
Hired labor 188 7 43 3 4 14
Total 726 31 156 18 24 62
Weeding Banking Topping Harvesting & Curing
Grading 
& Baling Transp.
Uprooting Old 
Stems
Family labor 48 11 153 24 69 2 9
Hired labor 17 2 57 11 26 0 4
Total 65 13 210 35 95 3 13
Note: Those under age 15 were counted as 0.5. 
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cases such labor exchange was used for farm tasks that required a lot of labor 
at a given time, such as the harvesting of maize. However, the contribution of 
exchanged labor to a family’s overall labor input was low (less than 10 per-
cent). In Table 3.1 exchanged labor is included in the category of family la-
bor.
When a household has insufficient family labor to complete the farm tasks, 
hired labor is used. In the study villages, there were two types of farm tasks 
in which hired labor was most commonly used (Table 3.1). One was the farm 
tasks that required physical strength, such as land preparation and weeding. 
For these tasks, hired labor was frequently sought both by wealthy households 
who had enough capital to pay for the labor and by labor-deficient households 
(such as households headed by a female or elderly person) who could not 
fulfill these strength-demanding tasks. Another was the farm tasks that re-
quired a lot of labor. Examples of such tasks included tobacco grading, the 
topping of tobacco plants, and the harvesting of maize and tobacco. 
3.2 Types of Hired Labor
The types of hired labor used in the study villages were seasonal labor and 
task-contracted casual labor. The following section examines some character-
istics of these two labor contracts.
3.2.1 Seasonal Labor
In seasonal labor contracts, laborers are employed for several months in the 
rainy season. In most cases in the study villages the seasonal laborers came 
from other areas, and no kin relations were found between employers and 
laborers. The contracts were only for one season, and the laborers left the 
village after their contracts were up and rarely came back to the same em-
ployer in the next season. In the study villages, 10 percent of the sample 
households employed seasonal labor (Table 3.2). Many of the employers 
were wealthy farmers and all of them grew tobacco. Seasonal laborers were 
used either for a specific crop (usually tobacco) or for any farm tasks, depend-
ing on the agreement made between employer and laborer. In any case, the 
employer made all decisions on farm management, and the work of the labor-
ers was closely monitored and supervised.
The seasonal laborers received their wages both in cash and in kind. Pay-
ment of wages in cash was made at the end of the contract after harvest, but 
the amount to be paid had been agreed upon at the beginning of the contract. 
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Wages in kind were paid in the form of daily food. Employers provided sea-
sonal laborers with cooked foods, maize, or cash to buy food. When maize or 
cash was provided, laborers received them in advance on a weekly or 
monthly basis. Some employer also provided shelter to the laborers. The 
wages in kind guaranteed the basic survival of the laborers in the lean period 
of November–March during which many households faced food deficit.
The seasonal labor contract discussed above can be regarded as a form of 
fixed-wage contract in which an employer pays a laborer a fixed amount of 
wage that was agreed upon in advance. In a fixed-wage contract, risks of 
production failure and of produce price changes are born by the employer. In 
the study villages, however, we found many cases where contracts were 
amended so as to enable employers to share risks with laborers, as the follow-
ing cases illustrates.
TABLE 3.2   Uses of and Engagement in Agricultural Wage Labor
Kachamba 
(n = 31)
Belo 
(n = 30)
Horo 
(n = 32)
Bongololo 
(n = 33)
No. of 
cases (%)
No. of 
cases (%)
No. of 
cases (%)
No. of 
cases (%)
Uses of agricultural wage labor:
    Seasonal labor 1 (3) 4 (13) 1 (3) 9 (27) 
    Task-contracted casual labor 18 (58) 13 (43) 11 (34) 21 (64) 
Engagement in task-contracted 
  casual labor 14* (45) 16 (53) 16 (50) 10 (30) 
    Of male-headed households** 8 (36) 11 (48) 2 (14) 6 (27) 
    Of female-headed households** 6 (67) 5 (71) 14 (78) 4 (36) 
Mulawa 
(n = 28)
Mbila 
(n = 32)
Total 
(n = 186)
No. of 
cases (%)
No. of 
cases (%)
No. of 
cases (%)
Uses of agricultural wage labor:
    Seasonal labor 0 (0) 4 (13) 19 (10) 
    Task-contracted casual labor 17 (61) 6 (19) 86 (46) 
Engagement in task-contracted 
  casual labor 7 (25) 18 (56) 81 (44) 
    Of male-headed households** 4 (22) 16 (59) 47 (37) 
    Of female-headed households** 3 (30) 2 (40) 34 (57) 
* Including wage labor on estates.
**  Percentages are the percent shares of cases to the total number of male/female-headed 
households in each village.
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Cases of seasonal labor contracts:
(1) JB in Mbila employed two seasonal laborers between September and 
June for his 1.6 ha farm of tobacco, maize, and groundnuts. The laborers 
performed any farm tasks that JB ordered. The employer provided the labor-
ers with daily food and shelter during the period, and paid MK 4,000 to each 
of them at the end of the contact. The amount of cash paid was determined by 
the employer after he received money for the tobacco harvest.
(2) EM was using a seasonal laborer between November and April and 
provided the laborer with food and shelter in Mbila. EM and the laborer had 
agreed in advance that MK 12,000 would be paid to the laborer after EM re-
ceived money from his tobacco sale. However, due to the erratic rain and low 
tobacco price that year, the amount EM received for his tobacco was much 
lower than what he had expected. EM negotiated with the laborer again, and 
it was agreed that he would pay MK 4,000 to the laborer.
(3) Between September and June, AB in Mbila employed a seasonal la-
borer to whom AB provided 60 kg of maize and MK 175 every month to 
cover the cost of food. In addition, AB and the laborer had agreed in advance 
that the laborer would receive a lump sum cash payment, and that the amount 
to be paid would vary according to the level of tobacco production. Following 
this agreement, AB paid MK 3,000 to the laborer after the tobacco harvest.
(4) LG in Bongololo employed two seasonal laborers for nine months from 
September. LG divided his 1.2 ha tobacco farm into two parts and let each 
laborer do all the farm tasks on each part of the farm. He paid each laborer 
260 kg of maize in advance, and agreed that MK 24,000 would be paid at the 
end of the contract. However, the lack of rain in the 2004/05 season consider-
ably reduced the yield, and he consequently paid only MK 12,000 to one la-
borer and MK 10,000 to another. LG himself suffered a large deficit that year 
because of the reduced tobacco production.
In the four cases above, the amount of wages in cash paid at the end of the 
contract was reduced after a bad harvest or determined according to the pro-
duction level. This arrangement is similar to that of a share contract in the 
sense that an employer and a laborer share the risk of production. In a share 
contract, when the production level is low, both employer and laborer receive 
less income. In a fixed-wage contract, on the other hand, low production 
levels only affect the income of the employer, while the laborer receives the 
same amount of wage irrespective of the level of production. Therefore, we 
can regard the seasonal labor contracts practiced in the study villages as a 
form of fixed-wage contract that contains a risk-sharing characteristic of 
share contracts.
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This characteristic of seasonal labor contract provides some merits to both 
employers and laborers in the context of rural Malawi. For employers it pro-
vides a means of risk sharing in a highly uncertain condition of agricultural 
production. Relying totally on rain-fed agriculture, smallholder farmers oc-
casionally face production failure due to unfavorable weather. Moreover, the 
price of agricultural produce fluctuates widely, adding another risk of a fall in 
income for producers. Under these situations, the risk-sharing arrangement 
with laborers in a seasonal labor contract can help ameliorate an income 
shock faced by the employers.
Reducing the amount of wages in cash in a bad harvest year is clearly a 
demerit for laborers. On the other hand, the seasonal labor contract guarantees 
the food security of laborers during the lean period through the payment of 
wages in kind. The guaranteed provision of food during this season is crucial 
because many poor households in rural Malawi who exhaust their maize stock 
during the rainy season have to look for opportunities of casual labor in order 
to buy food. Seasonal laborers have no need to do so because their contracts 
guarantee the opportunity of income smoothing (Morduch 1995) through the 
payment of wages in kind by the employer. Thus, the unique characteristics 
of seasonal labor contracts provide the employer with a means of risk sharing 
and the laborer with a means of income smoothing.
3.2.2 Task-contracted Casual Labor
Task-contracted casual labor (ganyu2) was widely used for various farm 
tasks in the study villages. In this contract, wages were paid upon completion 
of a specific task, such as weeding. The rewards varied depending on the 
types of work and the ages of the laborers. There were some distinct differ-
ence between task-contracted casual labor and seasonal labor. First, the dura-
tion of work in task-contracted casual labor was much shorter (typically less 
than a week but occasionally a few weeks) than that of seasonal labor. Second, 
laborers were recruited from within the village or nearby villages. Third, the 
percentage of sample households using task-contracted casual labor (46 per-
cent) was much higher than that using seasonal laborer (10 percent). User 
households included both wealthy households who had enough cash to pay 
for laborers and poor households who had insufficient family labor to com-
plete farm tasks by themselves.
On the other hand, engaging in task-contracted casual labor was mostly 
confined to poorer households. The total engagement rate among the sample 
households was 44 percent, but the rate shows important gender differences. 
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Fifty-seven percent of the sampled female-headed households engaged in 
task-contracted casual labor while only 37 percent of the male-headed coun-
terparts did. The difference stemmed from the fact that the average agricul-
tural and household income of female-headed households was relatively low 
(see Chap. 7 for details), forcing them to seek any means of income sources.
In task-contracted casual labor contracts, laborers were paid in cash or in 
kind (usually maize or cooked food) or both. Table 3.3 summarizes the means 
TABLE 3.3   Means of Payment in Task-Contracted Casual Labor by Farm Task
A. Tobacco Production
Farm Task
Means of Payments (No. of Cases)
TotalCash
Only
Cash +
Food
In Kind
 Only
In Kind 
+Food
Cash + 
In Kind
Cash + In
Kind + Food
Food
Only
Land preparation 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 7
Nursery 13 5 1 0 0 0 0 19
Transplanting 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 5
Manure/fertilizer  
    application 2 8 1 0 0 0 0 11
Constructing barn 9 5 2 0 1 0 0 17
Weeding 7 8 1 1 1 0 1 19
Banking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Topping 5 7 3 1 2 1 1 20
Harvesting & curing 7 13 0 1 0 0 0 21
Grading & baling 6 20 0 0 0 0 0 26
Transporting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uprooting old stems 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 7
Total 56 75 9 3 5 1 3 152
Percent share 37% 49% 6% 2% 3% 1% 2% 100%
B. Maize Production
Farm Task
Means of Payments (No. of Cases)
TotalCash 
Only
Cash + 
Food
In Kind 
Only
In Kind
 + Food
Cash + 
In Kind
Cash + In 
Kind + Food
Food 
Only
Land preparation 13 9 7 2 0 1 1 33
Sowing 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 7
Fertilizer application 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 6
Weeding 10 4 9 2 2 0 1 28
Banking 9 4 6 0 0 0 1 20
Harvesting 3 1 10 3 0 0 1 18
Total 41 21 35 7 3 1 4 112
Percent share 37% 19% 31% 6% 3% 1% 4% 100%
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of payment to casual laborers engaged in tobacco and maize production. It is 
noteworthy here that, first, in both tobacco and maize production the majority 
of payments involved cash and, second, there were sizable cases of payment 
in kind (mainly maize) for the casual labor used in maize production.
In fact, some maize-surplus households used task-contracted casual labor 
extensively for farm work in maize production and paid laborers with maize. 
A wealthy farmer with 2 ha of farm land in Kachamba, for example, used 
task-contracted casual labor for his maize and groundnut farms for 65 man-
days and paid them 37 pails (about 740 kg) of maize. As the season of high 
demand for task-contracted casual labor (October to March) coincides with 
the time when poorer households exhaust their maize stocks, these labor ar-
rangements provide an important opportunity for households lacking maize 
to survive during the lean period.
Nevertheless, as Englund (1999) and Devereux (1999) rightly argue, task-
contracted casual labor is neither an arrangement of wealth-sharing nor an 
informal transfer between the rich and the poor. Rewards are paid as returns 
on the labor provided on the basis of a commercial exchange. On the other 
hand, it is also true that villagers share the feeling of moral obligation 
whereby wealthy farmers should provide other villagers with opportunities to 
engage in task-contracted casual labor. Thus, the labor arrangement conveys 
the image of both an economic contract and a social obligation (Whiteside 
2000, pp. 4–5; Ellis et al. 2003, p. 1509; Bryceson 2006, p. 178).
Some literature has suggested that the engagement of poor households in 
task-contracted casual labor (ganyu) may result in food insecurity. For ex-
ample, Whiteside (2000) suggested that the need to do task-contracted casual 
labor to obtain an immediate supply of food may mean less labor input on 
one’s own farms in a less timely manner during this critical farming period, 
which may result later in a smaller harvest and can lock some households into 
a vicious cycle of food insecurity. For this reason, Devereux suggested that 
engagement in task-contracted casual labor can be an erosive survival strategy 
when farmers neglect their own farming activities (Devereux 1999, p. 12). 
The data obtained in the six study villages suggest the need to distinguish 
between amount and timing of labor input when we examine the potential 
competition between task-contracted casual labor and own-farm production. 
It is true that the households who engaged in task-contracted casual labor 
produced less maize per hectare than those who did not, as Table 3.4 shows. 
However, the correlation coefficients between maize production per hectare 
and labor input per hectare in five villages (except in Belo3) were statistically 
insignificant. This implies that the higher productivity of maize was not 
caused by increased labor input. In addition, the labor input on one’s own 
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TABLE 3.4   Task-contracted Casual Labor and Maize Production
Kachamba Belo Horo
Engaged/Non-engaged
  households in task-
  contracted casual labor
Engaged Non-engaged Engaged
Non-
engaged Engaged
Non-
engaged
No. of cases 14 17 16 14 16 16
Maize production (kg/ha) 872 1,234 483 487 156 423
Labor input on maize farming 
  (man days/ha) 209 198 194 124 245 174
Correlation coefficient between
  maize production per hectare 
  and labor input per hectare
0.246 0.440* 0.206
Fertilizer input (kg/ha)** 40 90 10 17 54 108
Bongololo Mulawa Mbila
Engaged/Non-engaged
  households in task-
  contracted casual labor
Engaged Non-engaged Engaged
Non-
engaged Engaged
Non-
engaged
No. of cases 10 23 7 21 18 14
Maize production (kg/ha) 1,189 1,641 696 1,531 575 895
Labor input on maize farming 
  (man days/ha) 176 161 193 178 223 157
Correlation coefficient between
  maize production per hectare 
  and labor input per hectare
-0.121 0.051 0.205
Fertilizer input (kg/ha)** 88 72 67 139 84 128
Total
Engaged/Non-engaged
  households in task-
  contracted casual labor
Engaged Non-engaged
No. of cases 81 105
Maize production (kg/ha) 622 1,015
Labor input on maize farming 
  (man days/ha) 206 162
Correlation coefficient between
  maize production per hectare 
  and labor input per hectare
N.A.
Fertilizer input (kg/ha)** 48 84
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Total application irrespective of types of fertilizer.
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maize farm plots among households providing task-contracted casual labor 
was not less than that of other households (Table 3.4). This implies that en-
gaging in task-contract casual labor does not reduce the labor input on one’s 
own farm land. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the timing of 
labor input on one’s own farm could influence the production level. For ex-
ample, weeding on an employer’s farm for a long period of task-contracted 
labor may delay the timing of weeding on one’s own farm, resulting in less 
optimal production output. The present study lacks the data to examine this 
possibility.
The difference in maize productivity between the two types of households, 
observed in the six villages, seemed to be the result of the level of fertilizer 
use. As Table 3.4 shows, those who engaged in task-contracted casual labor 
used much less fertilizer on their maize farms than other households. This is 
because poorer households who engaged in task-contracted casual labor to 
obtain an immediate supply of food had no working capital to purchase fertil-
izer, thus resulting in less harvest. Therefore, the low productivity among the 
households providing task-contracted casual labor was not caused by the low 
input of labor but by the low level of fertilizer used.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the labor use and labor contracts observed in agri-
cultural production. It revealed that the characteristics of labor contracts in 
the study villages were interrelated with the high risk of agricultural produc-
tion and the problem of food deficit during the lean season. This interrelation 
was examined in the case of seasonal labor contracts that provided a means of 
risk sharing for employers and of food security for laborers. The chapter also 
examined some features of task-contracted casual labor and highlighted the 
fact that the relations between user and provider of casual labor were interwo-
ven into the wealth differences among the households. In addition, the chapter 
showed that the low productivity of maize among the households engaging in 
task-contracted casual labor was not caused by the low level of labor input 
but by the low level of fertilizer use.
Notes
  1   Parts of this chapter are based on Takane (Forthcoming, a). 
  2    Ganyu refers to all kinds of piecework, including nonagricultural work. Through-
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out this book, use of the word ganyu is deliberately avoided in order to make the 
distinction between agricultural wage labor and nonagricultural wage labor.
  3    One possible explanation for the statistically significant correlation coefficient in 
the case of Belo is that many households in the village have to establish new 
farms on unopened land which requires much labor, and the newly established 
farms produce better harvest due to good soil conditions.
